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Note on Timeline
•This presentation is told from the GSFC SMA 
viewpoint as we saw the story come together.
• It is not told in chronological order.
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About 10 months after launch of LandSat-8 an anomalous current trend was 
noted on the Mechanism Control Electronics (MCE) on TIRS A side electronics.  
Over time the current began to grow at an exponential rate and an anomaly 
investigation commenced.  A lengthy investigation could not confirm root cause, 
however it was suspected at the time that a Conductive Anodic Filament (CAF) 
was creating a shorting path within the A side electronics.  To prepare for 
possible loss of MCE, tests were conducted to understand a mirror’s drift 
without positive feedback control.  
Approximately 5 months after resuming nominal operations on the TIRS B side, 
indications of an anomalous current were observed.
TIRS on-orbit SSM anomaly
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• In preparation for TIRS-2, Code 300 was reviewing anomaly history of TIRS,
noting the behavior and open items on the fishbone
• Code 300 was concurrently performing reverse bias capacitor testing to 
support projects using the Express Logistics Carrier (ELC) on ISS.
• Behavior of the on-orbit leakage currents on TIRS bore a striking 
resemblance to the reverse bias capacitor performance in our ground testing
TIRS on-orbit anomaly cont’d
5
TIRS Current Offset By 54E-3 A. 
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• Suspecting a polarity problem, polarized capacitors on TIRS were thoroughly 
examined.  The polarity was correct for all capacitors in the affected area.
• GSFC SMA requested that spare boards be brought out of storage to be 
powered up 
• A thermal camera was placed over the board to watch for hot spots.
• Not long after power-up, the board started to exhibit an increase in (leakage) 
current reflective of the on-orbit behavior
– Many attempts were made to power cycle the boards, induce recovery, or 
otherwise affect the profile, with mixed temporary results
TIRS on-orbit anomaly cont’d
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• After weeks of operation, noticeable locations of excessive temperature rise 
were seen on the board. These were located in the vicinity of some RC filters 
feeding into amplifiers on the board
TIRS on-orbit anomaly cont’d
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Differential Temperatures 
from Front of PWA
Actual Temperatures 
Once the PWA was Inverted
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• Localized heating gave a strong indication that the caps were 
cracked. 
• The manufactures do not recommend hand-soldering of 
ceramic capacitors, and the ”failing parts” were hand soldered.
• This is the first instance we have seen of cracked capacitors 
making it through I&T undetected and becoming anomalous 
on-orbit.
• In all cases the cracks on TIRS did not propagate to the 
surface of the part.
TIRS on-orbit anomaly cont’d
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Cracked DelaminatedExpected
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• Once removed from the PWA C-mode Scanning Acoustic Microscopy (C-
SAM) was performed on the anomalous parts, which subsequently showed 
delaminations that aligned with cracks internal to the parts that subsequently 
lined up with the hot spots on the parts.
• Fortunately, we had hundreds of spares from the LDC (1011-BY) that enabled 
some lot-based views.  
• A large-scale effort to perform C-SAM was undertaken, resulting in discovery 
that about 50% of the LDC 1011-BY parts had delaminations internal to the 
pristine parts, in many cases similar to that present in the anomalous parts.  
• While the hot spots line up with the delamination features, we have not fully 
established the delamination features as failure or degradation mechanisms
TIRS on-orbit anomaly cont’d
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• Investigation revealed that this specific problem was discovered in at least 
one classified mission years ago, but proper warnings did not make their way 
into the NASA community.  
– Through significant dialog with others affected by this problem, we were 
able to gather an abundance of information to help bound the problem and 
define paths forward.  
– Events occurred on at least one classified system, but the failure and 
resolution details are unclassified.
Outside Investigation
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• Due to the “Outside” information we began performing C-SAMs on other 
spare parts that we had on hand, first to determine whether there was lot 
dependence, and next to start exonerating applications on GSFC projects 
– Lot dependence was established
– Many more lots are clear of the problem than those that exhibit the problem
– Some lots, however, do exhibit the problem, but none to the extent of 
1011BY.  
Internal Testing Prompted by 
Outside Investigation
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• While talking to some of our Parts Engineers it was found that 
SDO had had a problem that could be attributed to the present 
problem
– In 2007, LASP and MIT engineers found a leaky capacitor on the EVE 
instrument’s MEGS-A board. 
– While on the board, the part was inspected and photo-documented, no 
visible anomalies were noted. 
– In preparing for sectioning, the part was removed from the board and leads 
were attached using a soldering iron.  The capacitor was potted for cross 
sectioning.  Then during a standard check test it was found that the 
capacitor was no longer shorted, and the short had been lost.
SDO capacitor failures
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SDO capacitor failures
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– Sectioning at the 5-percent cross section level found a delamination spanning 
between capacitor terminations. 
– Cross sectioning continued to approximately the 10-percent level, at which the 
delamination was fully revealed and seen to extend from termination to termination 
of the capacitor. 
• Ultimately, the part was replaced and the rest of the lot remained in place
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• In May of 2014, the MEGS-A board in the EVE instrument experienced a voltage 
drop, prompting ops to move it into safe mode
• Problem was ultimately traced to a capacitor from the same LDC (0509) as the 
part mentioned above.  
• Many attempts were made to clear the short, as had been done for other 
capacitor-related shorts
• Ultimately, MEGS-A was shut down after several unsuccessful attempts
• Recently a parts engineer recalled a discussion with one of the LASP engineers 
concerning a capacitor failure, which prompted us to open some records 
associated with SDO/EVE. 
• Review of the original FA from 2007 and the details of recovery efforts for EVE, 
indicated that the problem appears to be related to our current ceramic capacitor 
problem
• The part number and lot date code were then found in one of the recent C-SAM 
batches we had tested and declared to be an implicated lot.  
• The parts in the MEGS instrument were all handsoldered
– MEGS-B had parts from the same LDC, but they were handsoldered by a 
different organization
– MEGS-B exhibited no anomalies or failures
SDO capacitor failures (cont’d)
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• The process to C-SAM parts that are spares from lots that are installed on 
spacecraft and instruments has been completed to the extent that spares 
exist on all projects except for one.  
• The manufacturer has performed 85% RH/85 deg C accelerated life testing 
on 25 parts from the 1011-BY lot installed using their preferred method of 
reflow soldering, then 50 parts on two boards handsoldered by GSFC 
contractors.  A very high percentage of the handsoldered parts visibly 
cracked.  For the manufacturer-installed parts, three parts severely degraded 
in IR (< 50 kohms), and the others degraded by 2-4 orders of magnitude.  
Therefore, at least with a “bad” lot, handsoldering is not necessary to degrade 
the parts.
• In some cases, very few parts were available, so we performed combinations 
of 85/85 testing, solder dip tests, and other thermal stress tests to try to 
exonerate them or establish them as very low risk.
Recent testing completed
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• Most, if not all, parts in a “bad” lot are likely to have the same defect, and 
probably the same potential for anomalous behavior, subject to the thermal 
stresses they encounter (even if they have no delaminations)
• If we perform “blind” statistical assessments, they should be based on 
likelihood of encountering a bad lot, rather than overall percentage of 
delamination defects
• Bad lots may be more prone to external cracking (based on 1011BY LDC 
assessment)
– Could be a sign of weak integrity of the ceramic
• Parts affected by this problem are generally in-specification but none of the 
specifications at the time were sufficient to address the degradation of the 
part that occurs in the installation process
We think we know
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• Even bad parts from bad lots may be just fine over a long period of time
• Handsoldering and manual touchups are a very important risk factor
• There are cases where handsoldering processes are well controlled such that 
bad lots are used successfully
• In the DoD program, there were four bad lots over multiple subsystems and 
the only parts replaced were those that had had manual touchups, and no 
related anomalies have been reported
We definitely know
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• NASA advisory has been released:  NA-GSFC-2017-002
Advisory status
18
S AF E T Y  a n d  M I S S I O N  AS S U R AN C E  D I R E C T O R AT E  C o d e  3 0 0
• A part issue has been identified that is intrinsic to a number of pre-2011 ceramic 
capacitors 
• Over a dozen failures were encountered on one DoD program in I&T
• Multiple major on-orbit anomalies occurred on LandSat-8/TIRS due to capacitor 
degradation
– Repeated on the ground using spare hardware
• The EVE MEGS-A instrument failed due to a capacitor short, with a second one 
emerging with a similar problem
• All incidents involved intrinsically flawed, but in-specification, ceramic capacitors 
(leadless), and had either manual soldering installation or hand touchups
• Intrinsic flaws are LDC-dependent, but more LDCs are free from the problem than 
those that have the problem
• Testing has indicated that with the worst lot, problem may exist in parts that are 
reflow soldered, but also that even parts from the worst lot may be installed 
manually in a very benign way, and may not exhibit problems
– First indications are that they elevate risk significantly, but are not necessary
Summary
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